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Lol I've already seen several users challenge you to trace their Monero transactions and nothing but crickets from you πŸ¦—πŸ¦—πŸ¦— "they only identify the sender in about 1 in 15 cases" In other words - random chance πŸ€¦β€β™‚οΈ "I still think you'll need a considerable amount of off chain data" Monero never claims to protect the privacy of things that are external to it's blockchain...no crypto can
Someone challenged me to trace his transaction to its source yesterday on Bawdy Anarchist's twitter space and I denied the ability to do so. I want to build more automatic decoy eliminators because without them you need lots of off chain data that I don't know how to get or that is expensive to acquire. I am not sure how far you can get using only chain heuristics to identify the true spender; I suspect it's higher than 1 in 15 but lower than 100%. One monero dev offered a helpful cli tool that detects all instances when a stealth address has appeared in a ring; this is something my tool is currently missing and would greatly help with building taint trees. I hope that through community effort my tool continues to improve in effectivelness. The bad guys shouldn't be the only ones with a tool like this, and before yesterday only ciphertrace had a tool like this (that I know of anyway)
more lies lol since you insist on acting like a 12 yr old I'll treat you like one in the context of a cryptocurrency a "transaction tracing tool" would be able to identify the source, destination and amount of transactions. random chance identifies the sender in "about 1 of 15 cases" the recipient that is published on-chain is a one time stealth address. not useful for tracing since SAs break the transaction graph. and amounts remain opaque. additionally, if it takes "a considerable amount of off-chain information" to *actually use* NOBODY is tracing monero transactions. Because that off-chain data generally doesn't exist. (may be exceptions concerning individuals of interest targeted by 3 letter agencies. know your threat model) this tool doesn't trace monero transactions, by definition. it's a block explorer. just let it be a block explorer and quit trying to use semantics to push inaccurate fud.
> in the context of a cryptocurrency a "transaction tracing tool" would be able to identify the source, destination and amount of transactions I don't think it has to automatically do that. A tracing tool is good if it helps automate some parts of the tracing task even if other parts remain manual. > random chance identifies the sender in "about 1 of 15 cases" But random guessing uses no data. This tool uses *data* to identify the sender. A random guess would not be grounds for doing anything. A statistical analysis is worth a lot more. > the recipient that is published on-chain is a one time stealth address. not useful for tracing since SAs break the transaction graph. They do not break the transaction graph. Stealth addresses do not appear just once, they appear again whenever the recipient spends his money and possibly in other transactions as decoys. Filtering out the decoys leaves you with only the true spend tx. You can do that *because* there is a tx graph that stealth addresses appear multiple times in. > and amounts remain opaque Except part of the amount is visible (the fee) and gives you info about the amount in the outputs as well as in the inputs > additionally, if it takes "a considerable amount of off-chain information" to *actually use* NOBODY is tracing monero transactions Seems like you contradict yourself here. First you say "nobody" and argue that the data doesn't exist, then you admit some people might do it and governments might have that data. Not a good look.
>"they always have been (traceable)" >"Someone challenged me to trace his transaction to its source yesterday on Bawdy Anarchist's twitter space and I denied the ability to do so" wtf bro πŸ˜‚ I listened to part of your conversation with Bawdy and enjoyed it. Agreed with almost everything you said there. I just think you claim too much on social media, or use terms in an unorthodox way which is why you get all these reply guys like myself. Looking forward to you and Luke talking on Seths pod next πŸ‘Œ
Read the comments. These supposed bitcoiners blindly believe outlandinsh claims without verifying just because they like the "conclusion".
I have a way to manually identify yourself as a decoy but I haven't automated that yet. What I want to do is use known "view keys" to identify decoys, because if you have the view key you know the "true" tx in which you spent your own coin, do if you've been used as a decoy you can automatically filter that out. Right now it uses two heuristics: merge analysis and recency bias. If you received coins in two very close blocks and then spend them together, your ring, which should contain keys from random blocks, will have two suspiciously close blocks where you held both inputs. So you can identify those as the real spender's coins. Recency bias takes advantage of the fact that most decoy selection algorithms are biased toward selecting keys from recently created utxos. Ones that are significantly older stick out like a sore thumb. Other metrics I want to add include bot detection (which is based on identifying txs with many outputs, since these tend to be created by automated software rather than a real person) and taint tree analysis (which creates trees of possible senders fanning out backward in time from a known destination).
This looks like a good tool for helping to visualize the monero blockchain actually. It doesn't trace transactions, don't get excited.
you can't stop lying can you? you are using heuristic analysis, which is NOT a deterministic relationship. your tool identfies the *likely true spend at a certain (undefined) probability and it does it no better than random chance (but automatically! πŸ™„) I suggest if you're actually interested in operating in good faith you prioritize telling the user the probability your heuristic analysis is accurate. ie, the odds an old ouput decoy WOULD be used in a ring etc