Ah I see, the OP is saying that it isn't in code. Guess we'll have to wait for public comment. I dont have the tech chops to verify either way, nor do I have any direct contact with anyone from Ashigaru.
but isn't that wording kind of weird?
we're not concerned with the keys being sent to the client... we're concerned the *coordinator being able to link inputs/output, not the clients.
it seems like theyre addressing a different issue there.
Ah I see, the OP is saying that it isn't in code. Guess we'll have to wait for public comment. I dont have the tech chops to verify either way, nor do I have any direct contact with anyone from Ashigaru.
its not a vulnerability if they're modulating the hardcoded key per CJ round correct?
as @npub1vadc...nuu7 suggested on original vulnerability disclosure post Jan 7th?
either way, the server CANNOT give clients a unique key for identification.
afaict its false because they have hardcoded a key into the client.
therefore the server cant assign different RSA keys to different clients to map their inputs/outputs.
fd0 was premature in thinking the vulnerability hasnt been addressed.
this guy only repeats stuff that fits his bias, without understanding them himself.
nobody has had time to thoroughly review Ashigarus Whirlpool implementation yet.
so far it's clear they have done some work to fix that vulnerability.
Cyph3rp9nk
New ashigaru whirlpool coordinator can de-anonymize users
And now, if the coordinator signs outputs with the same static blind key in all rounds, an attacker can accumulate those signatures and redeem them later to register additional outputs without contributing new inputs. It does not allow them to steal funds, but it breaks the round balances and causes it to fail, blocking all other participants (DoS).
And on top of that, they don't mitigate the vulnerability they've tried to remedy with this crap...
If they were at least humble, they would get help...
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