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When the Law Works, Families Live: Gaza and UK Responsibility

The central conclusion is clear and public-facing: If UK-linked activity risks contributing to harm against Gazan families, the law requires timely, coordinated action using existing powers. Protecting families is not an optional policy choice — it is the point of the law itself. Life-giving action means using the law to stop harm before it happens. In practice, it is this: when there is a real risk to civilian life, especially to Gazan families, the UK must act immediately to prevent its money, contracts, exports, and institutions from sustaining that harm. That includes suspending licences, freezing assets, restricting finance, halting procurement, and opening investigations—using powers that already exist. Life-giving action is not symbolic. It is preventive, timely, and comprehensive. It chooses protection over process, and human survival over delay. Put simply: > Life-giving action is the law doing what it is meant to do: protect families while there is still time.

Published:

Below is case law mapped directly to each enforcement channel, showing how courts have treated non-assistance, facilitation, finance, exports, and ministerial duty. These authorities are routinely relied on in UK courts and international forums.

CASE LAW — BY ENFORCEMENT CHANNEL

  1. Ministerial duty / non-assistance / urgency

R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade

UK Supreme Court, 2019 Principle: Ministers must keep export decisions under continuous review and reassess when new evidence of IHL violations emerges. Key holding:

A rational decision requires proper consideration of whether there is a clear risk that exports might be used in serious violations of IHL. Relevance: Confirms ongoing duty; delay or partial measures are unlawful once risk is credible.

Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro

International Court of Justice, 2007 Principle: Duty to prevent genocide arises once a state is aware, or should be aware, of a serious risk. Key holding:

A State breaches its obligation if it manifestly fails to take all measures within its power to prevent the crime. Relevance: Establishes the “totality” standard — partial steps are insufficient.

  1. Exports, licensing, and enabling assistance

R v B (Arms Export Control)

UK Divisional Court, 2001 Principle: Export control law must be interpreted in line with the UK’s international obligations. Relevance: Supports using Article 32, catch-all, and OGEL withdrawal expansively where IHL risk exists.

Prosecutor v Tadić

ICTY Appeals Chamber, 1999 Principle: Aiding and abetting requires practical assistance that has a substantial effect on the commission of crimes. Key holding:

Assistance need not be indispensable; it is sufficient that it facilitates the crime. Relevance: Directly applicable to exports, technology, and logistics.

  1. Finance, assets, and economic facilitation

Prosecutor v FurundĹľija

ICTY Trial Chamber, 1998 Principle: Aiding and abetting includes financial or other support provided with knowledge of the crime. Key holding:

The actus reus consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect. Relevance: Financial support squarely qualifies.

R v Jogee

UK Supreme Court, 2016 Principle: Liability attaches where a party intentionally assists or encourages criminal conduct, knowing the essential facts. Relevance: Applies to corporate and financial actors who continue support with awareness of risk.

United States v Krauch (IG Farben Case)

Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1948 Principle: Industrialists and financiers can be criminally liable where their economic activities enable international crimes. Key holding:

Participation through economic support and production can constitute complicity. Relevance: Foundational authority on corporate/financial facilitation.

  1. Sanctions, asset freezes, and enforcement discretion

Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

UK Supreme Court, 2016 Principle: Sanctions and asset freezes are preventive, not punitive, and can be imposed on a risk basis. Relevance: Supports early asset freezes to prevent facilitation, without waiting for convictions.

Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2)

UK Supreme Court, 2013 Principle: Financial restrictions must be rational and proportionate, but courts accept preventive economic measures where national/international security is at stake. Relevance: Confirms Treasury’s authority to act decisively in the financial sphere.

  1. Criminal liability for facilitation (UK law)

R v Zafar

UK Court of Appeal, 2008 Principle: Knowledge of the essential circumstances is sufficient for assisting/encouraging liability. Relevance: Applies to banks, investors, insurers, and suppliers aware of the end-use risk.

R v Anwar

UK Court of Appeal, 2012 Principle: Assistance need not be close in time or space; remote facilitation still qualifies. Relevance: Directly rebuts arguments that finance or asset management is “too indirect”.

  1. Procurement and corporate exclusion

EnergySolutions EU Ltd v Nuclear Decommissioning Authority

UK Supreme Court, 2017 Principle: Public authorities must act consistently with public law duties and international obligations in procurement. Relevance: Supports exclusion or suspension of suppliers implicated in serious violations.

  1. Totality and cumulative impact

Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (dissent relied on in later cases)

ECtHR, 2001 Principle: Where violations are of the highest order, formal barriers cannot excuse inaction. Relevance: Supports cumulative-impact analysis and rejects procedural evasion.

SYNTHESIS (COURT-READY)

From these cases, courts consistently apply four rules:

  1. Knowledge of serious risk triggers duty (Bosnia v Serbia; CAAT).

  2. Assistance includes finance, assets, and economic activity (Tadić; Furundžija; IG Farben).

  3. Indirect or remote support still qualifies (Jogee; Anwar).

  4. States must take all measures within their power, in totality (Bosnia v Serbia).

One-sentence legal conclusion

Case law establishes that once serious international crimes are plausibly occurring, ministers must deploy all available export, financial, asset-freezing, supervisory, and criminal powers; partial or siloed action is legally insufficient.

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