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What Makes a #CryptoWallet Truly Secure? It’s not just storage it’s trust. At #BlockchainAppsDeveloper, our Cryptocurrency Wallet Development focuses on advanced encryption, user control, and seamless blockchain access. Visit: 📞WhatsApp: +919489606634 📧Email: support@blockchainappsdeveloper.com #wallet #crypto #cryptocurrency #cryptocurrencynews #cryptocommunity #cryptowealth #bitcoin #bitcoinnews #usa #uk #japan #canada #singapore #australia #uae #elsalvador #singapore #estonia #germany #southkorea #malta #switzerland image
What Makes a #CryptoWallet Truly Secure? It’s not just storage it’s trust. At #BlockchainAppsDeveloper, our Cryptocurrency Wallet Development focuses on advanced encryption, user control, and seamless blockchain access. Visit: 📞WhatsApp: +919489606634 📧Email: support@blockchainappsdeveloper.com #wallet #crypto #cryptocurrency #cryptocurrencynews #cryptocommunity #cryptowealth #bitcoin #bitcoinnews #usa #uk #japan #canada #singapore #australia #uae #elsalvador #singapore #estonia #germany #southkorea #malta #switzerland
Bitcoin 30 wallet deletion bug severity analysis and how it could have been prevented with damagebdd #Faceplant is inevitable without #verification ... running and gunning with no coverage ... Bitcoin Core v30’s “wallet deletion” class bug (reported Dec 20, 2025) is Severity: High (user-funds at risk via local data-loss) even if it’s “just” a filesystem mistake. What happened (failure mode) A user migrates a legacy (BerkeleyDB) wallet.dat to the new descriptor wallet format. Migration appears to complete, then on restart Bitcoin Core can’t find the wallet — and the entire wallet directory is missing (not just a single file). The issue report shows a backup being created, then later Core logs: Specified -walletdir "/mnt/bitcoin/wallets" does not exist. v30 explicitly pushes users into this path because legacy BDB wallets can’t be created/loaded anymore and must be migrated. Severity analysis (why this is not “minor”) Impact Worst case: user believes funds are gone (because keys are “gone” locally), triggering panic actions and risky recovery steps. Even if a .legacy.bak exists (as the report suggests), the UX is still “your wallet vanished”, which is catastrophic for a custody component. Likelihood Likely rare / edge-path (mount points, walletdir on external storage, permissions, path handling, race/cleanup logic). But the key is: it happens during a routine “recommended” workflow. Blast radius Local-only, but wallet software is where local-only bugs become existential. This is the exact class of bug that wrecks trust: silent destructive side effects. Overall High severity for wallet users (data-loss class). Critical severity if any downstream tooling assumes “migration is safe” and automates it. --- How this could have been prevented (DamageBDD lens) This is the quintessential “#Faceplant is inevitable without #verification” moment because the expected behavior is plain English: > “Migrating a wallet must never delete the wallet directory (or anything outside the target wallet file set).” DamageBDD-style prevention is basically: codify invariants + run them continuously across realistic environments. 1) Lock in non-destructive invariants (BDD, not vibes) Examples of invariants that should have had tests before shipping: Migration creates a new descriptor wallet and preserves originals (or preserves a recoverable backup). Migration never removes walletdir, even on failure, interruption, restart, or partial state. Cleanup routines only delete files they created, within an allowlist, and only after a post-migration validation step. 2) Regression matrix that matches real operator setups This bug smells like a path/FS edge case. So the test matrix should include: walletdir on mounted volumes (/mnt/...), network FS, removable disks symlinks read-only / noexec mounts low disk space abrupt process exit mid-migration concurrent wallet open/close sequences 3) Safety rails in implementation (what verification would force) Two-phase commit for migration: write to new location → fsync → verify open/read → only then mark migrated. Never “rm -rf a directory” as cleanup; delete explicit filenames you created. Crash-safe journaling: on restart, detect “migration in progress” and roll forward/rollback safely. --- A DamageBDD-flavoured BDD feature (catch it automatically) Even without filesystem assertions, you can catch “walletdir vanished” by probing RPC behavior after migration. Feature: Bitcoin Core v30 wallet migration must be non-destructive Background: Given I am using server "http://127.0.0.1:8332": And I set "Content-Type" header to "application/json" Scenario: migratewallet does not break wallet directory visibility When I make a POST request to "/" """ {"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":"m1","method":"migratewallet","params":[]} """ Then the response status must be "200" Then the json at path "$.error" must be "null" # Post-condition: walletdir still exists from Core’s perspective When I make a POST request to "/" """ {"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":"m2","method":"listwalletdir","params":[]} """ Then the response status must be "200" Then the json at path "$.error" must be "null" Those step types (server selection, headers, POST, status checks, JSON-path assertions) are exactly the sort of primitives DamageBDD is built around. --- The punchline (your framing is correct) This isn’t “haha a bug”. This is: Running and gunning with no coverage → destructive edge case → users eat the blast. #Faceplant is inevitable without #verification. Hashtags (one line): #Bitcoin #BitcoinCore #Wallets #DataLoss #BDD #DamageBDD #Verification #ReliabilityEngineering #DevSecOps #RegressionTesting #Faceplant
ZachXBT: Hardware wallet maker Ledger has suffered another data breach through its Global-e payment system, which has exposed the personal data of some customers, including names and contact information. #crypto #bitcoin #wallet #ledger #market #grownostr