People working on post-quantum-proofing vulnerable encryption protocols (and curious onlookers) can find lots of value in this new post from Cloudflare. It discusses the herculean engineering challenges of revamping anonymous credentials that will be broken by a quantum computer. There's a growing need for this kind of privacy (for instance to make digital drivers licenses privacy preserving), which allows individuals to prove specific facts, like they have had a drivers license for more than 3 years, without divulging personal information like their birthday or place of birth. The long and short of of the challeng is that engineers can't simply drop quantum-resistant algorithms into AC protocols that currently use vulnerable ones. Instead, engineers will need to collaborate with standards bodies that build entirely new protocols, largely from scratch. The post goes on to name a few of the most promising approaches. https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-anonymous-credentials/
AMD, Intel and Nvidia have poured untold resources into building on-chip trusted execution environments. These enclaves use encryption to protect data and execution from being viewed or modified. The companies proudly declare that these TEEs will protect data and code even when the OS kernel has been thoroughly compromised. The chipmakers are considerably less vocal about an exclusion that physical attacks, which are becoming increasingly cheap and easy, aren't covered by the threat model These physical attacks use off the shelf equipment and only intermediate admin skills to completely break all TEEs made from these three chipmakers. This shifting Security landscape leaves me asking a bunch of questions. What's the true value of a TEE going forward?. Can governments ever get subpoena rulings ordering a host provider to run this attack on their own infrastructure? Why do the companies market their TEEs so heavily for edge servers when one of the top edge-server threats is physical attacks? People say, "well yes. just run the server in Amazon or another top tier cloud provider and you'll be reasonably safe." The thing is, TEEs can only guarantee to a relying party that the server on the other end isn't infected and couldn't give up data even even if it was. There's no way for the relying party to know if the service is in Amazon or in an attackers's basement. So once again aren't we back to just trusting the cloud, which is precisely the problem TEEs were supposed to solve?
> The affected US‑EAST‑1 is AWS’s oldest and most heavily used hub. Regional concentration means even global apps often anchor identity, state or metadata flows there. When a regional dependency fails as was the case in this event, impacts propagate worldwide because many “global” stacks route through Virginia at some point. > Modern apps chain together managed services like storage, queues, and serverless functions. If DNS cannot reliably resolve a critical endpoint (for example, the DynamoDB API involved here), errors cascade through upstream APIs and cause visible failures in apps users do not associate with AWS. That is precisely what Downdetector recorded across Snapchat, Roblox, Signal, Ring, HMRC, and others. (h/t @dragosr)
"Godfather of Silicon Valley" Ron Conway resigns from Salesforce board after its CEO revealed his authoritarian leanings by calling on Tump to send national guards to San Francisco. "“It saddens me immensely to say that with your recent comments, and failure to understand their impact, I now barely recognize the person I have so long admired,” Conway tells Marc Benioff in an email.
My profound thanks to Susan Stamberg, probably the biggest single reason I gravitated to journalism in my late teens. She was also a trailblazer for women. She died today at the age of 87. My condolences to her family. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/16/1184880448/susan-stamberg-obituary